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Abstract
Bayt Dakira, a historical, religious, cultural, and academic institution located in the heart
of Essaouira’s old medina, seeks to conserve Jewish-Moroccan memory and promote values of
peace and tolerance as exemplified by the city’s history of Jewish-Muslim coexistence. As an
institution dedicated to conserving the culture of a people that have all but virtually emigrated
from Morocco, Bayt Dakira’s purpose is initially unclear. This study uncovers the ways in which
Bayt Dakira is an example of a seemingly apolitical institution being wielded to advance national
and international political agendas. As an officially apolitical place of cultural and academic
exchange, Bayt Dakira is ideal for developing ties with other nations, building trust with them,
and laying the groundwork for the formation of joint economic and political initiatives. As an
apolitical-presenting institution advancing values of global peace, Bayt Dakira is also a
non-threatening stage from which Moroccan diplomats can criticize, from a seemingly high
moral ground, conflict abroad. Bayt Dakira’s celebration of Morocco’s diversity also constructs a
national identity—one that unites all Moroccans under the Constitution and the King.

Key Words: Political Science, History, Religion
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Introduction
On Friday, March 25th, I stood under the warm lamplight of Slatt Attia, the synagogue
attached to Bayt Dakira—a cultural, academic, and historical museum-like institution aiming to
conserve the memory and history of Essaouira’s previously majority Jewish population
(Schroeter, “The Town of Mogador (Essaouira) and Aspects of Change in Pre-Colonial
Morocco” 31)—listening to a mix of Sephardic, Ashkenazi, and Moroccan shabbat service
prayers and songs offered by a delegation of New York University students and rabbis. Also
present at the service was a group of Moroccan graduate students, the Mayor of the city, and
André Azoulay, the Jewish advisor to King Mohammed VI of Morocco and before that to his
father, King Hassan II. Partway through the event, one New York University rabbi offered a
prayer for American Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser
Bourita, who were that week meeting to discuss Moroccan-American relations and issues
ranging from climate change to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (“Secretary Antony J. Blinken and
Moroccan Foreign Minister Nasser Bourita” 2022). These diplomats would also meet with
representatives from Israel, Bahrain, Egypt, and United Arab Emirates later that week to discuss
strategies for supporting the Palestinian Authority and for improving the lives of Palestinians
(“Joint Press Statement” 2022) living under Israeli apartheid (Amnesty International 2022).
Bayt Dakira bills itself not as a museum but as a historic, cultural, and academic
institution. It hosts academic conferences, musical performances, educational events for students,
and religious services like this shabbat service. Tourists, many of them Moroccan-Jewish
diaspora members looking to reconnect with their cultural heritage, frequent the space. Director
Ghita Rabouli describes it as a “living space,” one that “takes inspiration from the past to project
the future.” The meaning of Bayt Dakira’s name, “House of Memory,” is also a key to
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understanding the space’s purposes: Bayt Dakira aims to be a “house” that welcomes and shelters
all—regardless of identity—under a shared roof, as well as to be a keeper of “memory.”
At this shabbat service, I was intrigued by the collision of politics, religion, history,
memory, and culture. As a mixed-race person with a multicultural heritage, I have always been
interested in spaces where cultures meet and mix. It was for this reason that I selected SIT’s
Multiculturalism and Human Rights program in Morocco. My fascination with the shabbat
service also stemmed from my own heritage as a secular Ashkenazi person and a desire to learn
more about different Jewish cultures around the world. The potential use of culture to
diplomatically navigate an issue as controversial as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict also fascinated
me. This event prompted a desire to learn more about Moroccan-Israeli relations and Muslim
Moroccans’ perceptions of Israel—a state that oppresses their Muslim Palestinian compatriots.
Furthermore, I’ve long been interested in the complicated ethical implications of museums—how
they can be used to conserve or monopolize historical narratives. Relatedly, Bayt Dakira made
me curious as to why, in a country with virtually no Jewish community left as a result of mass
emigration to Israel, the Moroccan government had chosen to build an institution focused on
preserving the Jewish-Moroccan experience (DellaPergola 69). In studying the political
implications of Bayt Dakira, I saw an opportunity to immerse myself more fully in these
interests. I thus developed the following research question: To what extent have
Jewish-Moroccan cultural and historical institutions, in particular Essaouira’s Bayt Dakira, been
politicized for the purpose of building diplomatic ties with Israel?
Bayt Dakira’s first objective is to share Essaouira’s history of Jewish-Muslim peaceful
coexistence with the world. From the passion, warmth, and enthusiasm of Bayt Dakira’s
spokespersons, it is apparent that the message of tolerance that they advance is genuinely felt.
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From guestbook testimonies and my own surveying of visitors—domestic and international
tourists, scholars, and students alike—we can also conclude that Bayt Dakira makes an
overwhelmingly positive impression on those who visit it. Visitors of Moroccan-Jewish heritage
to Bayt Dakira are among the many moved by its message and are also touched to find that their
memories or their grandparents’ memories of growing up in Morocco and Essaouira have been
preserved.
But Bayt Dakira also advances Moroccan political agendas at the national and
international level. Although memory and culture are manipulated at Bayt Dakira to advance
political objectives as I initially suspected, I discovered that the purpose of these manipulations
are broader than just building ties with Israel and the United States. Through the incorporation of
memory and culture, Bayt Dakira not only enriches the historical narratives that it
presents—making them more relatable and engaging for the viewer—but also distorts them,
simplifying and sanitizing the history of Jews in Moroccan society.
There are three political purposes for advancing this distorted history. First, through
narratives of peaceful Muslim-Jewish coexistence, Bayt Dakira promotes Morocco as model for
the world. Second, in portraying Morocco as a pluralistic and democratically liberal society, Bayt
Dakira advances a narrative of Moroccan exceptionalism, distinguishing it from other
Arab-Muslim nations and moving it closer towards its democratic liberal allies like Israel and the
United States. Third, by advancing Moroccan pluralism and religious coexistence, Bayt Dakira, a
state-funded institution, legitimizes King Mohammed VI as the rightful spiritual leader of the
nation and consolidates the monarch’s power. In presenting itself as a politically neutral
institution, Bayt Dakira also gives André Azoulay—the King’s Moroccan-Jewish advisor and
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Bayt Dakira’s visionary—a non-threatening stage from which he can criticize Israel’s oppression
of Palestinians without jeopardizing Moroccan-Israeli political and economic relations.
First, I will contextualize my research with the theoretical discourses, historical
background, and political context necessary to understand Bayt Dakira’s position as a conserver
of memory and distorter of history, as well as its uses as a tool for international diplomacy and
for forming a national identity. Then, I will lay out my methodology for this research project,
including my research methods, the limitations of my study, and the study’s ethical
considerations. After introducing my two research sites, Bayt Dakira (my case study) and the
Museum for Moroccan Judaism (my control), I will present my findings and draw conclusions.
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Literature Review
In this literature review, I will contextualize my findings with pre-existing discourse on
the interactions between history and memory in knowledge-producing institutions, the role of
pluralism in constructing national identity, and strategies for international soft-power and cultural
diplomacy. As a counter to the sanitized historical narratives advanced by Bayt Dakira, I will
also present a more nuanced history of Jewish-Muslim relations in Morocco. Next, I will outline
the constitutional political powers of the Moroccan monarchy, as well as the ways in which the
monarch’s position as Commander of the Faithful and use of concessions to Moroccan ethnic
groups has enabled it to avoid challenges to its authority. Finally, I will contextualize
Moroccan-Israeli political and economic relations.

Collective Memory and History
Maurice Halbwachs was the first sociologist to explore the subject of memory (Vromen
2). He advanced a theory of “collective memory,” arguing that not only are memories shaped by
society and thus shared by groups of individuals, their recollection is also prompted by shared
reference points in time and space (Halbwachs 1). In discussing the role of space in constructing
and preserving collective memory, Halbwachs writes:
In an antique shop the various eras and classes of a society come face to face in the
scattered assortment of household belongings. One naturally wonders who would have
owned such an armchair, tapestry, dishes, or other necessities. Simultaneously … , one
thinks about the world recognizable in all this, as if the style of furniture, the manner of
decor and arrangement, were some language to be interpreted… each object appropriately
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placed in the whole recalls a way of life common to many men. To analyze its various
facets is like dissecting a thought compounded by the contributions of many groups. (1)
Halbwachs suggests here that spaces—and the objects in them—can remind us of our own
experiences, help us recall the people who have passed through them, and connect us with people
in identical spaces and with identical experiences. In this way, spaces are sites for the creation
and sharing of memory. Halbwachs also argues that space shapes group identity and is in turn
imbued with the memories and character of the group (2). He posits that groups maintain a
shared sense of identity despite being separated from one another, because they all have shared
recollections of the physical home that they left behind.
In contrast to Halbwachs, who suggests that memories can be re-experienced collectively,
Funkenstein argues in his book Perceptions of Jewish History that no two people can ever
remember a given event in the same way (Klein 133). Instead, he contends that collective
memory is “‘characterized by a system of signs, symbols, and practices’” (133) like memorial
dates, the names of places, monuments, museums, and texts. Funkstein’s theory thus makes way
for the theorizing of memory as an institutionally constructed phenomenon. Collective memory
becomes tied to artifacts and no longer bound to individual psychological processes of memory
retention. It becomes something for scholars to reconstruct in the form of historical narratives.
Pierre Nora contends that memory and history are incompatible. He argues that memory
is created and conserved through the daily maintenance of connections to the past via cultural
traditions, oral histories, and other social practices of “so-called archaic and primitive societies”
(8). By contrast, history is a “problematic and incomplete” (8) reconstruction of the past. He also
describes memory as “affective and magical” (8), whereas history is an “intellectual and secular
production … [belonging] to everyone and to no one, whence its claim to universal authority”
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(9). Nora’s theory of memory is in opposition to Halbach’s: While Halbach suggests that
memory can be objectively understood and reconstructed through monuments, museums, and
artifacts, Nora suggests that, as a lived and living thing, memory cannot be understood or
reconstructed by scholars.
Knowledge-generating institutions are able to position themselves as conservators of
memory and of history. In doing so, they can use the language of memory and subjectivity to
appeal to the pathos of learners, while also positioning themselves as objective knowledge
producers with the sole authority to determine whose memories and histories are worthy of
conservation. Kerwin Lee Klein critiques Nora’s theory of collective memory, arguing that it is
inaccurate to claim that true memory has disappeared along with the “so-called archaic and
primitive” (Nora 8) cultural practices that Nora believes are the vehicle for collective memory.
Klein argues instead that collective memory “survives” (Klein 137) among people of color and
challenges “exclusionary” (137) collective histories. He goes on to suggest that the increased
intertwining of history and memory in academic spaces is a “healthy result of decolonization”
(137). Yifat Guttman coins the term “memory activism” (1) to refer to Palestinian and
Palestinian-ally groups who challenge state narratives on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by
collecting and disseminating the testimonies of Palestinian survivors of Israeli violence. The
challenging of exclusionary histories can thus occur not only through cultural practices, but also
through activism.

Pluralism and Nationalism
The extent to which different ethnic groups can and should be integrated into ethnically
plural societies is a popular topic of discourse among scholars and politicians. Post-colonial

11

theorists argue that racial, ethnic, and cultural groups are defined along lines of inequality,
namely economic inequality (Winter 34). In liberal theories of pluralism, political communities
are not formed based on ethnic or cultural affiliation, but rather by “neutral procedures” that
guarantee individuals their rights (46). Consequently, while liberal democratic systems may
appear at the surface to be “neutral” (46) and to guarantee the rights of all, these procedures do
not necessarily recognize the inequalities between—and that define—ethnic groups and
ultimately reinforce those inequalities.
In his “Politics of Recognition,” Charles Taylor argues against difference-blind systems,
arguing instead in favor of a “politics of difference” (39). In a politics of difference, Taylor
contends that, while individual rights should still be upheld by institutions, institutions should
also work to ensure the “survival” (40) of difference and of different cultures. Taylor believes
that cultures that have “animated whole societies over some considerable stretch of time have
something important to say to all human beings” and should be preserved and celebrated.
Elke Winter explores the role that pluralism plays in the construction of national identity,
advancing a Weberian theory of social cohesion in pluralistic societies (5). She argues that “the
compromise between two, unequal, groups–‘us’ and ‘others’–becomes meaningful only through
the presence of (real or constructed) outsiders (‘them’)” (5). In other words, in a pluralistic
society, ethnic groups of unequal means can only coexist or even share a sense of identity if they
are united against some outsider group. We can then infer that a pluralistic national identity can
only be constructed if it is emphasized as a contrast to other national identities.
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Soft Power and Cultural Diplomacy
Joseph Nye defines soft power as the ability to shape the preferences and interests of
others (95) and contends that it arises from a nation’s building of relationships with other
countries through the communication of “its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its
political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when
they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)” (96). Nye outlines three communication
strategies that nations deploy to increase the effectiveness of their soft-power diplomacy
(101-102). First, nations that live by their values, following them up with action, gain credibility
and improve their image internationally. Second, countries that advance simple themes and
narratives are better remembered and able to command more attention. Symbolic events can be
particularly useful tools in this regard. Third, countries are more successful in garnering soft
power when they work consistently to build lasting relationships with key figures through
conferences, seminars, exchanges, access media channels, and other means. Nye argues that soft
power is a tool for competition (100): It is wielded to improve a nation’s image and position in
the world and to erode the image and position of others. In working to develop a nation’s soft
power, it is crucial to consider the nation’s target audience and to appeal to the specific culture of
that audience (103). I would also add that tapping into emotion and shared experience are
effective strategies that nations might employ to build soft power.
Kyriaki Oudatzi builds on ideas of soft power to advance a theory of cultural diplomacy.
Cultural diplomacy in Oudatzi’s view is an alternative form of diplomacy in which culture is
wielded to “[bring] people together” and “[break] down prejudices… leading to respect and
acceptance of diversity [and] highlighting at the same time culture as a remarkable and certainly
widely accepted solution.” Cultural diplomacy can involve the export not only of a nation’s
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cultural heritage, but also of its contemporary popular culture. Through cultural diplomacy,
nations work to build a “brand” for themselves and to distinguish themselves from others.
Nations also engage in cultural diplomacy to familiarize others with their values and customs to
build trust. Like Nye (103), Oudatzi describes cultural diplomacy as a “two-way communication
process” in which a state shares its culture with other nations and also learns about other nations’
cultures in the process.

The History of Jews in Morocco
In the early 1900s, Moroccan Jews numbered approximately 250,000 and made up the
largest Jewish population in any Muslim country (Laskier 323). In Essaouira, the Jewish
population outnumbered the Muslim one (Schroeter, “The Town of Mogador (Essaouira) and
Aspects of Change in Pre-Colonial Morocco” 31). Jewish presence in Morocco dated back to the
Phoenician and Roman Empires, but swelled in the fifteenth century with the expulsion of
Sephardic Jews from the Iberian Peninsula (Wyrtzen 180-181).
The position of Jews in Moroccan society has been complex since their arrival. In
pre-colonial Morocco, Jews—along with Christians—held the protected status of dhimmi. As
dhimmi, they were required to pay a tax called jizya and were restricted in certain aspects of their
economic and religious life (184). For example, they were not allowed to occupy administrative
and judicial positions, build synagogues higher than mosques, or ride horses (Wynchank 146).
Despite this, Jews and Muslims generally lived in harmony. Jews often lived in mellahs
or Jewish quarters, but interacted with Muslims in the suq or market place (Schroeter, “The
Changing Landscape of Muslim-Jewish Relations” 47). One Moroccan proverb emphasizes the
extent to which Moroccan Jews were integrated into the market place and Muslim community
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there: “A suq without Jews … is like bread without salt” (47). In the 7th and 8th centuries, Jews
sometimes served as diplomats, leveraging their ties from the Jewish diaspora to Europe on
behalf of sultans (47). In the nineteenth century, they also worked as royal business agents,
managing the oligarchy’s agricultural and manufacturing monopolies and building economic
relations with Europe. Music also brought together Jews and Muslims (59). Jewish professional
musicians outnumbered Muslim ones and as a result, they often performed local genres in
coffeehouses, for Muslim patrons, and in palaces. Some musical ensembles were also composed
of a mix of Muslim and Jewish musicians.
Under the French protectorate, Moroccan Jews were labeled subjects of the sultan in an
attempt by the French to reinforce the sultan’s power and maintain their own power through him
(Wyrtzen 205). The French protectorate also initiated education policies aimed at assimilating
Jews into French culture, creating rifts between Moroccan nationalists and Jewish Moroccans
(196). Leading up to World War II, the Jewish population became apprehensive about growing
anti-semitic sentiments from French colonials and Moroccan nationalists (201). In Meknes, one
of the “fascist strongholds” (201) of the French colonial population, anti-semitic graffiti was
written on buildings throughout the city. In Tetouan, a group of Moroccan nationalists translated
Nazi propaganda which made its way to and circulated in the Fes medina (200). Many Moroccan
nationalists called on Jews to stand in solidarity with them in their resistance against the French
and their fight for independence (193). In 1956, on the eve of independence, a new organization
called al-Wifaq—an alliance of Jews and Muslims—publicly condemned the invasion of Egypt
by France, Britain and Israel in the Second Arab-Israeli War (Schroeter, “The Changing
Landscape of Muslim-Jewish Relations” 57).
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Tensions increased between nationalists and Jews as awareness grew in nationalist circles
of the increasing number of Jewish colonial settlements in Palestine (201). Muslim-Jewish
relations were worsened by the 1937 water riots in Meknes in which Muslim protestors, in their
anger and frustration with the municipal government, turned on the mellah and damaged
forty-three storefronts. While then-sultan and future king Mohammed V privately exhorted
Moroccan-Jewish leaders to stay loyal to their country, his public pan-Arabism and emphasis on
Morocco’s Muslim identity contributed to uncertainties concerning the position of Moroccan
Jews (213). Mohammed V is often celebrated as a protector of the Jews under the Vichy regime,
preventing their deportation to European concentration camps (Wagenhofer 2012). However, the
accuracy of his role as a protector of Moroccan Jews during World War II is unclear.
With the place of Jews in the nationalist movement unclear and in reaction to the Zionist
movement, several instances of Muslim-Jewish violence occurred between 1944 and the
establishment of Israel in 1948 (Wyrtzen 201). In 1944 in Sefrou, following an altercation
between a Muslim colonial soldier (“goumier”) and Jewish man, four hundred goumiers attacked
Jewish residential areas of the city with stones and clubs. Afterwards, two hundred Jews were
arrested, twenty-five of whom were condemned to prison sentences ranging from months to
years. In the same year, homes in Meknes’s mellah were systematically vandalized. On May 8th,
1945, altercations broke out between Muslims and Jews in both Casablanca and Marrakech.
Following the announcement of the United Nations’ plan to establish the state of Israel, the
Istiqlal nationalist movement launched a boycott campaign of Jewish businesses suspected to
have Zionist sympathies (213). After the declaration of Israel’s independence in May of 1948,
the King made a statement warning against violence and urging his subjects to keep the peace
(214). But in June of 1948, in riots in Oujda, sparked by rumors that a Jew had killed a Muslim,
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led to the deaths of five Jews and the destruction of 200 million francs worth of property (215).
That same evening, violence erupted in the nearby mining town of Djerada. Rioters armed with
sticks and mining axes pillaged Jewish establishments. Thirty-seven Jews were killed and
twenty-seven injured. Mellah residents fled or sheltered with Muslim friends and neighbors.
Zionist propaganda increased in Morocco with the Alliance Israelite Universelle’s
establishment of schools and offices in Morocco (183). Following World War II, the Residency
approved the establishment of a branch of the Zionist Federation which then rapidly facilitated
Jewish emigration to Israel (213). From 1948 to 1954, 36,948 left Morocco for Israel (Laskier
332). The pace of emigration increased around the time of Moroccan independence. By the 1967
Six Day War, nearly all of Morocco’s Jewish population had emigrated to Israel. In 2019,
Morocco’s Jewish population was estimated at 2,100 (DellaPergola 69).

The State of the Moroccan Monarchy
Until the late 1990s, scholars argued that the reforms granted to protest movements by
Middle Eastern and North African governments indicated a linear evolution of these
governments from authoritarian to liberal democratic regimes (Cavatorta 75). But Cavatorta
argues that protest movements are “at best, ineffective in challenging authoritarianism [and], at
worst, a mechanism that reproduces authoritarian rule” (76). The February 20th Movement, the
Moroccan version of the Arab Spring, exemplifies the inability of protest movements to bring
about radical change and the ability of authoritarian regimes to mutate into semi-liberal
democratic ones. Unlike in other Middle Eastern and North African (“MENA”) countries, the
Moroccan monarchy was quick to make concessions to protestors and consequently avoided
being ousted from power (Madani III). While protesters’ demands for a new constitution were
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met, the Palace was heavily involved in its creation: A royal commission spearheaded the
Constitution’s drafting and the Royal Cabinet approved the draft prior to its referendum (Madani
et al. 7). Among other powers, the new Constitution grants the king the sole authority to revise
the constitution, appoint the Head of Government and other cabinet members, and chair the
Council of Ministers, which has veto power over the Council of Government. It therefore fails to
impose checks and balances on the monarch and his allies.
The King of Morocco, putative descendent of the Prophet Mohammed, is also called the
Commander of the Faithful and is seen as the religious leader of the Morocco’s Muslim majority.
As a result, he is perceived as a moral guide for the nation and is called upon to moderate
conflicts. For example, in the early 2000s, feminist movement leaders called on King
Mohammed VI to take a stance on and to moderate the controversy surrounding the conservative
Family Code (Belhabib 2022). In 2003, King Hassan II announced a new Family Code, stating:
“I cannot as Commander of the Faithful permit what God has forbidden and forbid what God has
permitted.” Here, we see him wielding his religious legitimacy and, with that, his political power.
Moroccans are not only united under the King in his role as religious leader, they are also
united in their plural identity under the 2011 Constitution (“Moroccan Constitution,” preamble).
The Constitution’s preamble enshrines the norms of plurality and unity:
With fidelity to its irreversible choice to construct a democratic State of Law, the
Kingdom of Morocco resolutely pursues the process of consolidation and of
reinforcement of the institutions of a modern State, having as its bases the principles of
participation, of pluralism and of good governance…
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The preamble outlines the liberal democratic principles that have shaped the Articles of the
Constitution. In naming each ethnic and cultural component of the nation—including Morocco’s
“Hebraic and Mediterranean influences,” it also emphasizes the importance of a united pluralist
society, one in which all are guaranteed equal rights through democratic systems. Finally, the
Constitution grounds values of tolerance in Islamic beliefs.

The State of Moroccan-Israeli Relations
The normalization of Moroccan-Israeli relations has significant implications for
Morocco’s economy and its disputed Western Saharan territory. Moroccan-Israeli relations began
tentatively after the signing of the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation
Organization in 1993 (Mejdoup 2022). Morocco broke diplomatic relations with Israel after the
2000 Intifada, resuming them again in 2020 by joining United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and
Sudan in signing the so-called Abraham Accords. In exchange for the signing of the Abraham
Accords, the United States affirmed Morocco’s sovereignty over the Western Sahara (Cuevas
2022). Since signing their normalization agreement, Morocco and Israel have inked four
agreements in the economic, commercial, and tourism fields. In 2021, the trade volume between
the two nations reached $131 million (Mejdoup 2022). Israel’s main exports to Morocco are raw
materials like rubber, plastic, and chemical products. Moroccan exports to Israel tend to be
textile, agricultural, and transportation products. Since the signing of the Abraham Accords,
Israel and Morocco have launched educational exchange programs, direct flights from Israel to
Morocco, and joint marketing initiatives to promote tourism. With the normalization of relations
and these tourism initiatives, officials expect a significant increase in the number of Israeli
tourists to Morocco, from 50,000 annually to 200,000 . Strong Moroccan-Israeli relations are
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important thus important to Morocco’s manufacturing and tourism industries. In March 2022,
Israeli Foreign Minister Lapid also voiced Israel’s support of Morocco’s plan to offer Western
Sahara autonomy within Morocco (Rabinovitch 2022).
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Methodology
Research Methods
My methodology for this research had five components. First, I worked to gain the
perspectives of Bayt Dakira’s spokespersons—those involved in its creation and management. I
interviewed Ghita Rabouli, the Director of Bayt Dakira, as well as Abdellah Ouzitane, University
of Bordeaux Professor and founder of Bayt Dakira’s Center for Studies and Research on Hebraic
Rights. To understand his perspective on and vision for Bayt Dakira, I also observed several
speeches and tours given by André Azoulay, the Jewish advisor to King Mohammed VI, who
spearheaded the Bayt Dakira project.
The second step of my research was to interview visitors to gain a sense of their reasons
for coming to Bayt Dakira and of the institution’s impact on them.
Third, I observed organized events and tours given at Bayt Dakira to better understand
the scope of its uses. I attended a tour and musical performance organized for the Royal
Motorcycle Club, as well as two days of a three-day conference on “Hebraic Culture and Rights:
Mutations and Normativities” organized by the Center for Studies and Research on Hebraic
Rights. I also observed two guided tours given to student groups and two tours given to
tourists—one composed of Jewish-Americans and the other composed of Israeli mayors and
deputy mayors.
Fourth, I analyzed Bayt Dakira’s exhibits and allocations of space to see what historical
narratives were being constructed and what political symbolism was being produced.
Lastly, I visited the Museum for Moroccan Judaism and interviewed its director, Zhor
Rehilhil, to gain another perspective on Judeo-Moroccan cultural and historical institutions in
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Morocco. In doing so, I aimed to use the Museum of Moroccan Judaism as a control for my case
study of Bayt Dakira.

Limitations
My study has a number of limitations. My first limitations were time and scope. For this
research project, SIT students were allotted a one-month research period. While I accomplished a
lot in that time, I would have liked to gain greater context for other ways in which Morocco
garners soft power and particularly the ways in which it uses its other cultural and academic
institutions to do this. In addition to interviewing the Museum of Moroccan Judaism’s Director,
Zhor Rehilhil, and visiting the Museum’s exhibits, I would have also liked to spend several days
doing participant observation at the Museum. Furthermore, I would have liked to speak with
representatives from Association Essaouira-Mogador (which works to promote cultural events in
Essaouira) and Association Mimouna (which works to preserve Moroccan-Jewish heritage) to
gain insight into the relationship of these nonprofits to Bayt Dakira and the role that these they
play in Morocco’s soft-power diplomacy. My research would have also benefited from a greater
diversity of perspectives. A weakness of my paper is the lack of Palestinian perspectives on
Morocco’s normalization of relations with Israel and its wielding of soft power to strengthen
these relations.
Again, I could have done more to examine the interplay of tourism and cultural
diplomacy at Bayt Dakira with the benefit of more time. My research would have also benefited
from a closer look at the impacts of tourism on the Moroccan national economy and Souiri
regional economy. It would have also been beneficial to quantitatively evaluate the nationalities
and ethnicities of tourists entering Bayt Dakira and to compare these statistics with regional and
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national statistics on tourism. It would have also been beneficial to survey visitors and attempt to
quantitatively evaluate their perceptions of Bayt Dakira’s messages.
Another potential limitation of my study is my personal biases. I am a person of Jewish
heritage, but claim no emotional, political, or cultural ties to Israel. If anything, I came into this
project sympathetic to Palestinian liberation. In my enthusiasm for uncovering Bayt Dakira’s
political agendas and its relevance to the Palestinian cause, I may have not explored enough in
depth the positive messages and impacts of Bayt Dakira. My desire to offset the historical
inaccuracies advanced by Bayt Dakira may have also led me to represent the history of
Jewish-Muslim Moroccan relations inaccurately and as overly negative. As a secular person, I
also cannot understand the experience of respecting a public figure for their inherited religious
authority. Thus, it is possible that I speak more harshly and with less nuance about King
Mohammed VI and his role as a religious leader than some Muslim Moroccan scholars might.
Language barriers are another limitation of my study. I conducted my interview with
Ouzitane and Rabouli in French and then conducted interviews with museum visitors in both
English and French. The speeches that I analyzed from the Conference on Hebraic Culture and
Rights were also all in French or translated from Hebrew to French. In translating speeches and
my interview notes into English, I sometimes ran into trouble translating the nuances of a
speaker’s meaning. In this sense, my research is limited by potential translation flaws. My
research is also limited by my inability to fluently speak Hebrew, Darija, or Fus’ha, as a good
number of visitors were Hebrew and Arabic speakers. Due to my inability to fluently speak these
languages, I was only able to analyze the guestbook notes that had been written in French and
English. To mitigate the Arabic language barrier, I created an online questionnaire with the
questions that I asked English- and French-speaking visitors to Bayt Dakira. I managed to have
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two Arabic speaking participants fill out the questionnaire. I then translated those responses with
Google Translate and was able to gain some insight into their perspectives. But with the
questionnaire format, I was unable to ask clarifying followup questions. With the written format,
visitors also kept their answers short to minimize typing time. Google Translate is also not the
most reliable translator. As a result, the translated questionnaire responses were mostly brief and
unclear. The questionnaire format also had limited use, because illiterate visitors—of which I
met one—were unable to complete it. I did not make a questionnaire for Hebrew speakers,
because I did not have someone who could proofread the Google Translations of my questions.

Ethics
I was careful to follow the ethical safeguards that I outlined in my proposal to SIT’s
institutional review board. I made clear to all my interviewees that their participation in my
research was optional, but that they would potentially be cited in my paper if they did choose to
participate. For the recordings that I did record, I asked permission to do so. Finally, I took notes
on public speeches made by Bayt Dakira’s spokespersons and on presentations by speakers at the
Conference on Hebraic Culture and Rights. Seeing as these speeches and presentations were
public, I felt that taking notes on and analyzing them was ethical.
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Introduction to the Research Sites
Bayt Dakira
Bayt Dakira’s building, situated in Essaouira’s old medina, dates back to the 19th century.
It was originally the house and private synagogue of the Attias, a family of Souiri-Jewish
merchants. In 1892, the building was given to the community, at which point the house’s second
floor was made the site of Essaouira’s rabbinic court. The synagogue’s last bat mitzvah was held
in 1980, after which the building fell into disrepair. Renovations on the building began in 2016,
spearheaded by André Azoulay and funded by both the Ministry of Culture and Association
Essaouira-Mogador. The building was officially inaugurated in 2020 by King Mohammed VI.
Bayt Dakira’s diverse daily functions distinguish it from a traditional museum. Its first
floor focuses on conserving Souiri-Jewish memory and history. On this floor is displayed objects
of religious and cultural significance: videos and photographs of the Jews and Muslims who
lived in Essaouira’s old medina; biographies of famous Souiri Jews; text and videos about past
and current Jewish advisors to Moroccan kings and sultans; and royal addresses and historical
timelines describing the status of Jews in Morocco.
In addition to preserving Jewish cultural heritage, Bayt Dakira fosters cultural exchange
by hosting frequent live Andalous music performances—Andalous being a musical genre
associated with the Jews and Muslims who fled the Iberian peninsula at the end of the fifteenth
century. On occasion, Bayt Dakira also hosts Shabbat services, Hanukkah celebrations, and other
religious gatherings in the synagogue named Slat Attia.
Bayt Dakira acts as an academic institution, hosting on its second floor the Haim and
Célia Zafrani Center for Research, a media and technology center whose growing collection
explores the history of Jewish-Muslim relations, and the Center for Studies and Research on
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Hebraic Rights, a research center seeking to understand, among other things, the structures of
rabbinic courts and the role of religion in the judicial interpretations of rabbis. The Center for
Studies and Research on Hebraic Rights hosts international conferences at Bayt Dakira.

The Museum of Moroccan Judaism
Casablanca’s Museum of Moroccan Judaism was founded in 1997 by the Foundation for
Judeo-Moroccan Heritage and installed in what had formerly been an orphanage called Home
d’Enfants Murdock Bengio. The Foundation’s leaders were Serge Bergugo, Boris Toledano,
Jacques Toledano, and Simon Levy. The Museum is privately funded, receiving no support from
the National Museum Foundation. It is directed and curated by Zhor Rehilhil, the former student
of Simon Levy.
In addition to their work on the museum, the Foundation initiated the renovation and
preservation of Jewish synagogues, cemeteries, and holy sites around Morocco. The Museum’s
first and largest room exhibits the fruits of the Foundation’s labor through before-and-after
photographs of the renovated sites. These photographs are accompanied by various
acknowledgements by King Mohammed VI of the renovations: a framed copy of his written
address at the 2013 inauguration of the renovated Synagogue Ettedgui, a photograph of his visit
to Synagogue Fassyne, and a Letter of Gratitude written to him by twenty-seven rabbis from all
over the world, thanking him for his support of the renovations.
The Museum of Moroccan Judaism’s collection is more extensive than Bayt Dakira’s. It
exhibits jewelry, clothing, circumcision tools, hanukkah lamps, synagogue lamps, tzedakah or
charity-collection boxes, chairs for marriage celebrations, serving trays, Sefer Torahs, and other
objects that capture various facets of Jewish-Moroccan religion and culture. A few art pieces by
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Moroccan-Jewish artists also hang in the museum. This art and these objects are often sent on
exhibit to other parts of Morocco. Information plaques in the museum seek to educate viewers on
a diversity of topics including Jewish religious holidays, Judeo-Arabic language hybridity, the
legacies of prominent Jewish-Moroccan rabbis, and the history of the building. While there is no
synagogue attached to the building, one room holds a Torah ark—the ornamental piece of
furniture in synagogues that holds the Torah, as well as a Torah reading table. The Museum also
exhibits other pieces of synagogue furniture in two other rooms.
Compared to Bayt Dakira, the Museum of Moroccan Judaism displays fewer images of
Moroccan Jews going about their daily lives. Bayt Dakira plays on repeat a compilation of
black-and-white videos that capture the daily interactions of Muslims and Jews in Essaouira’s
marketplace. The Museum of Moroccan Judaism does not have the same audio-visual
components. While the Museum of Moroccan Judaism is more holistic in its representation of
Jewish religion and culture, it does not do as much to capture the quotidien lives of Moroccan
Jews.
Like Bayt Dakira, the Museum of Moroccan Judaism hosts a mix of religious, cultural,
and academic events. An example of a religious and cultural event organized by the museum is
the Mimouna celebration, which follows Passover in Moroccan-Jewish traditions. The Museum
also organizes academic and educational events like conferences, book signings, and film
screenings to spread awareness and understanding of Moroccan-Judeo culture.
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Findings
As stated above in the Introduction, Bayt Dakira and to a lesser extent the Museum of
Moroccan Judaism present a sanitized and simplified version of Moroccan-Jewish history. This
distorted history serves at least three purposes: (1) boosting Morocco’s soft power internationally
by promoting Morocco as a model for how to construct a tolerant pluralistic democracy; (2)
moving Morocco closer to democratic liberal allies like Israel and the United States by
advancing a narrative of Moroccan exceptionalism that distinguishes it from other Arab-Muslim
nations; and (3) legitimizing the monarch as the nation’s rightful spiritual leader of the nation
and thus consolidating King Mohammed VI’s power. At the same time, Bayt Dakira gives André
Azoulay—the latest in a line of Jewish royal advisors and Bayt Dakira’s visionary—a
non-threatening stage from which he can be critical of Israel’s oppression of Palestinians without
jeopardizing Moroccan-Israeli political and economic relations.
I examine the impact of each of these distorting influences below.

Soft-Power Diplomacy through the Distortion of Historical Narratives
According to Nye’s theory of soft power, the spreading of a nation’s political values is a
facet of soft-power diplomacy. To retain credibility while serving the soft-power objective, Bayt
Dakira and the Museum for Moroccan Judaism must portray themselves as non-political
institutions that promote universal values. Thus, Bayt Dakira positions itself as making
humanistic appeals to the public and not political ones. In Rabouli’s presentations on Bayt
Dakira and in her opening speech at the Conference on Hebraic Culture and Rights, she
repeatedly used the language of “tolerance” and “co-existence.” She also repeatedly used the
imagery of Bayt Dakira planting “seeds of love.” In their presentations to tour groups, Rabouli
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and Azoulay called on visitors to Bayt Dakira to leave as “ambassadors of peace.” These values
of tolerance, co-existence, love, and peace transcend borders and appeal to all. In advancing
them, Bayt Dakira avoids advancing an overt political agenda, striving instead to appear to be
advancing an agenda of humanity.
Thus, when presenting Bayt Dakira to a tour group, Rabouli stated: “Culture says that
we’re all united, but politics does what it does.” In his opening speech of the Conference for
Hebraic Culture and Rights, Ouzitane warned that “fracturing, violence, and the denigration of
others is never far off [when we forget our common humanity]” and urged that “in this difficult
time, [we must keep trying].” Using universal values, Bayt Dakira’s spokespersons can make
vague political critiques without arousing suspicion that Bayt Dakira is a political institution.
Both Bayt Dakira and the Museum of Moroccan Judaism position their institutions as
historical, righting the amnesia of the past and transmitting Jewish-Muslim history to the next
generation. Through her curation, Rehilhil, Director of the Museum of Moroccan Judaism, aims
to tell history accurately and to “repair” the “neglect and erasure” of shared Jewish-Muslim
history. She attributes this “neglect” to the prevalence of pan-Arabism post-independence, the
emigration of Morocco’s Jewish population, and the Moroccan government prioritizing
economic and political policies over cultural ones. Azoulay likewise celebrated the fact that
objects preserving Jewish history and heritage can now be found at Bayt Dakira and that “we
[can now] find our own history on a website!” In his speech, Ouzitane added that we have a
“duty to transmit memory” to the next generation. The Museum of Moroccan Judaism’s and Bayt
Dakira’s positioning as historical institutions associates the historical narratives that they present
with the credibility, objectivity, and political neutrality assumed of intellectual institutions.
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Bayt Dakira’s spokespersons accordingly deny that Bayt Dakira advances political
agendas. When asked whether Bayt Dakira is a political institution in addition to being a
historical, cultural, and academic one, Rabouli stated that she did not see Bayt Dakira as a
political institution but rather as a “confirmation of a plural country.” Ouzitane rejected the
possibility that Bayt Dakira advances a political agenda: “If some people interpret it as political,
they can. But we don’t have a political agenda.” In his speech at the Conference on Hebraic
Culture and Rights, Azoulay distanced Bayt Dakira’s message of peace and tolerance from
politics, stating “I don’t want to make politics here … Not a political plan. [It’s] an ethical,
moral, and philosophical one. Morocco is proud to be spreading this message.” Bayt Dakira’s
spokespersons do not perceive or do not publicly admit to perceiving Bayt Dakira as a political
institution. Thus, they create and maintain a politically neutral image of Bayt Dakira.
While Bayt Dakira’s aim of preserving Moroccan-Jewish memory and experience may
appear to be in pursuit of objective truth, its decision to leave out particular elements of
Moroccan-Jewish history calls into question its objectivity and political neutrality as an
institution. The historical narratives advanced by Bayt Dakira center on Essaouira and the
experiences of Souiri Jews. In focusing on regional history, Bayt Dakira manages to avoid
discussions of the complicated citizenship status of Jews in Morocco across time—of their
previous second-class dhimmi legal status or of the jizya tax that they paid—and presents a more
sanitized history of the Jewish-Moroccan experience (Wytzen 184). Centering its historical
narratives around Essaouira also enables Bayt Dakira to avoid discussing international
politics—namely the creation of Israel in 1948. Bayt Dakira’s atrium, the central and largest
space in the building, displays biographies of prominent Souiri Jews of the diaspora like Lord
Leslie Hore Belisha, David Yulee Levy, and Ronit Elkabetz. Highlighting the accomplishments
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of Souiri Jews is beneficial for improving Jewish representation and for combatting Morocco’s
post-independence historical and cultural amnesia surrounding Jewish life. But these biographies
are not given sufficient national or international context. While the Souiri-diaspora Jews
highlighted in the exhibit are celebrated for their accomplishments abroad, Bayt Dakira fails to
explain their departure from Morocco, thereby circumventing discussions of the complex and
changing citizenship status of Moroccan-Jews across time, anti-Jewish violence, and the
controversial establishment of Israel. Even in its regional Jewish-Moroccan history, Bayt Dakira
leaves out discussion of Essaouira’s mellah, presenting the viewer with a politically
non-controversial and entirely positive historical account of Moroccan Jewish life.
For its part, the Museum of Moroccan Judaism aims to do “historical justice” by telling
the whole truth of Jewish-Moroccan history, religion, and culture. While no historical institution
can ever fully capture history or tell it in an unbiased manner, the Museum of Moroccan Judaism
conveys a more holistic and politically neutral Moroccan-Jewish history to visitors than Bayt
Dakira. In her guided tours, Rehilhil starts by explaining the history of Jews in Morocco “since
the beginning,” discussing their varied positions in Moroccan society across different political
regimes and regions. While the exhibits at the Museum of Moroccan Judaism don’t discuss,
much less explain, the emigration of Jews from Morocco, that subject is discussed in guided
tours. The Museum plans to include a section on Jewish emigration in its soon-to-be renovated
space and revamped exhibit. Following her outline of Moroccan-Jewish history, Rehilhil
introduces Moroccan-Jewish religious and cultural traditions to viewers. The Museum of
Moroccan Judaism thus seems to convey to viewers the diversity of Moroccan-Jewish
experiences across time and space, acknowledging the political contexts that shaped these
experiences.
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Part of the soft power cultivated by Bayt Dakira and the Museum is deployed to gently
criticize, and presumably influence, Israeli treatment of both Palestinians and of Mizrahi Jews.
Thus, in the presence of an Israeli delegation to the Conference, generic messages of peace took
on a different and a more pointed meaning. Dr. Haliwa argued in his presentation that “you can’t
make justice for yourself. You need reciprocity to establish peace.” In the context of a rare
meeting of Jewish Israelis and Muslim Moroccans, this idea of reciprocal justice recalls the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the mind of the viewer and is easily understood as a reproach of the
injustices perpetrated there. Similarly, Dr. Haliwa criticized Israeli law as not having sufficiently
integrated rabbinic rights and values. He suggested a need to transform Israel’s justice system
and policy approaches to conflict resolution, stating “If we create a situation of peace, we don’t
need courts.” Finally, he drew a distinction between European and Hebraic definitions of peace,
subtly critiquing the values guiding European politics: “Europe talks about the goal being no
war. In Hebraic law, the goal is peace.”
In the same vein, Moroccan-Israeli poet Erez Bitton criticized the discrimination against
Mizrahi Jews living in Israel. He noted that, while Arabic is considered the “language of the
enemy” in Israel, poetry allows Moroccan Jews to affirm their “legitimacy” in speaking Arabic.
Bitton also praised Moroccan-Jewish values of moderation, tolerance, family, and accepting
others. The Conference on Hebraic Culture and Rights thus gave Bitton a platform to make a
political statement through culture—to affirm his Moroccan identity, criticize anti-Mizrahi
discrimination in Israel, and promote Moroccan values.
Royal advisor Azoulay is explicit in his criticism of Israel and about Bayt Dakira’s
political objectives. In a guided tour provided to a group of Jewish-American tourists, he shared
his belief that “Moroccan Judaism can help the two people [Israelis and Palestians] to live in
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serenity and safety… We are helping Israel to bridge the gap by sharing our legacy.” He
referenced the Israeli-Palestinian conflict explicitly and placed the burden of resolving it on
Israel’s shoulders. At the Conference, he recalled the Israeli-Palestinian Casablanca peace talks
of 1990s, in which he participated. He passionately expressed regret at the assassination of Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and at the peace talks’ failure. He then went on to urge Conference
attendees to advocate for the “dignity,” “liberty,” and “citizenship” of “those before us,” because
“if the person before you doesn’t have, you don’t have.” By using the phrase “the person before
you,” Azoulay was not being entirely explicit about whose rights need protecting: He leaned on
generalizations to make his message easier to swallow. However, given the context of a rare
gathering of Israeli Jews and Moroccan Muslims, his meaning was clear: “Israeli delegates, look
at and see the humanity of the Moroccan Muslims before you. Return to Israel and see your
shared humanity with the Palestinians there. Then, fight for them as you would want them to
fight for you.”
Azoulay boldly used the language of militancy to stress how urgently peace between
Jews and Muslims must be brought about and to make clear his loyalties. In his opening speech
of the Conference, Azoulay called himself “militant [in support of] this Morocco in which
Judaism was stigmatized and mistreated,” implying that, despite the discrimination he had faced
as a Moroccan Jew, his loyalties lie with Morocco and its people. The word “militant” is also
particularly charged in this context, as Muslims are often portrayed as militant, extremist, and
violent (Farid 213, Ramon 13). In calling himself a “militant” Moroccan before an audience of
Israeli delegates, Azoulay seemed to place himself in solidarity with Muslim Palestinians who
are labeled as militant extremists but who in reality are fighting for justice. Azoulay’s speech
also celebrated in the fact that Bayt Dakira’s Director is a Muslim woman, and followed this with
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a critique of the misogyny and anti-Muslim sentiment present in Orthodox Judaism, stating,
“Sorry if you’re orthodox, but we need to say things with radicalism in the other direction so we
find reason.” Azoulay thus turned the charge of “radicalism” back against the Jewish
communities that would write Palestinians off as radical extremists, calling these communities
out for their hypocrisy and criticizing their dehumanization of women and Muslims.

Liberal Democratic Values and Moroccan Exceptionalism
In promoting Morccan pluralism and liberal democratic values, Bayt Dakira also
reinforces existing notions that, in the Arab-Muslim world, Morocco is an exception for its
democratic liberal values. The label “Moroccan exceptionalism” is frequently used by Moroccan
government officials and many political analysts and commentators (Hashas 2). To complicate
the notions of this exceptionalism, Mohammed Hashas evaluates the historical successes and
failures of Moroccan constitutions to create liberal democratic systems. He concludes that
Moroccan exceptionalism exists in the form of King Mohammed VI’s “democratic spirit” and
willingness to pass reforms (10). But Morocco is not the “exception” that it is frequently made
out to be, as the 2011 Constitution fails to construct a true parliamentary monarchy where the
King’s powers are limited by the separation of powers. Paul Silverstein echoes Hashas’s
disillusionment with the 2011 Constitution, suggesting that it benefits Morocco’s image abroad
more than its citizens at home:
While the new constitution certainly adopts the rhetoric of rights of the February 20th
movement and promises many of the political reforms and job creation mechanisms
demanded by the protesters, its ultimate audience may actually be an international
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community prone to question the future of officially Islamic states in a putatively secular
world. (138)
Both Silverstein and Hashas argue that Moroccan exceptionalism exists in the country’s
evolution towards a pluralist and liberal democracy. Silverstein argues that the Amazigh’s Hirak
protest movement in Morocco—in contrast to war in Libya, the refugee crisis, governmental
instability and authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, and Yemen, and the threat of
terrorist groups like al-Qaeda—is a conflict that will have a positive impact by increasing
Moroccan pluralism (130). He argues that solidarity between different ethnic protest movements
in Morocco is also a sign of positive, pluralist change in the Middle East. However, from
Cavatorta’s perspective, protest movements rarely bring about radical change and usually only
lead to reforms (76). By this logic, Morocco’s protest movements can be interpreted as signs that
ethnic communities and other groups of citizens are treated unequally under Morocco’s system
of government. While on the international stage Moroccan reforms are a symbol of its
“exceptionalism,” Morocco does not in fact uphold the normative values of liberal democracies.
It must thus use soft-power strategies to create an image for itself of a liberal democracy.
To combat global Islamophobia, Morocco uses soft-power institutions like Bayt Dakira to
distinguish it from other Arab-Muslim nations and cultures, and to help it build diplomatic ties
with the United States and Israel. Grosfoguel outlines four types of Islamophobia: racism in a
world-historical perspective (racism predicated on the “Christian-centric religious hierarchy of
the world-system” beginning at the end of the 15th century), cultural racism (the idea that
Islamic cultures are backwards, barbaric, and violent), Orientalism (the notion that patriarchal
fundamentalism exists only in Islamic nations and not also in Western cultures), and epistemic
racism (the portrayal of Islamic cultures as frozen in time) (11-18). Part of Morocco’s urgency in
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promoting itself as a liberal democratic nation stems from its need to counter racist ideas
promulgated by the West about Islam and Muslim-majority countries.
Morocco must maintain an image as a democratically liberal nation through soft-power
strategies to pursue beneficial economic and political agreements with Israel and the United
State—nations that also advance democratic liberal values. As previously outlined in the
literature review, Morocco has become increasingly politically and economically intertwined
with the United States and Israel. It seeks to garner the United States’ (Cuevas 2022) and Israel’s
support in its struggle to control the Western Sahara (Rabinovitch 2022). It also seeks to deepen
its economic ties with Israel, particularly in the realm of tourism (Mejdoup 2022). To accomplish
its political and economic interests, Morocco uses soft-power institutions like Bayt Dakira to
portray the nation as a democratically liberal one and bring it closer to the United States and
Israel.

Consolidating the Monarch’s Power as Commander of the Faithful
In January 2020, King Mohammed VI traveled to Essaouira for the inauguration of Bayt
Dakira. His visit to Bayt Dakira and the television coverage of this event worked to cement his
power as Commander of the Faithful. Chief Rabbi David Pinto and Chief Rabbi Joseph Israel
were present at the event, as was royal advisor André Azoulay. At the event, Mohammed VI
explored Bayt Dakira’s exhibits, admired the Torahs in Slat Attia, prayed in the synagogue, and
offered two Sefer Torahs to Bayt Dakira as a gift. In his speech, Azoulay thanked His Majesty
for his presence at Bayt Dakira. He praised Mohammed VI for his leadership in the world and his
conservation of Moroccan values of peace: “The world needs this Moroccan compass—a world
in need of repair. A world that turns its back on all the values that are those of our country under
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the leadership of your Majesty” (Bayt Dakira 2020). Azoulay portrayed Mohammed VI as a wise
and moral leader and suggested that other nations should learn from his example.
This high praise benefits Mohammed VI’s image. In an Middle East Online article, Chief
Rabbi Pinto was equally complimentary of the King, stating that “if we are here today, it’s
because of King Mohammed VI. He is the best king in the world” (Gerraoui 2020). A statement
like this from a rabbi—a representative of the Moroccan-Jewish community—solidifies
Mohammed VI’s legitimacy as king and as Commander of the Faithful—of Jews and Moroccans
alike. Chief Rabbi Pinto also offered Mohammed VI a blessing which again symbolically
marked the Jewish community’s approval of and enthusiasm for the monarchy (Bayt Dakira
2020). In television coverage of the inauguration, Jewish and Muslim attendees are also shown
enthusiastically bending to kiss the King’s hand upon his entry into Bayt Dakira and following
the prayers and speeches. This visual also shows Mohammed VI to be not only a friend to the
Moroccan-Jewish community but also a benevolent ruler of all Moroccans, regardless of their
religion, ethnicity, culture, or creed.
Bayt Dakira’s exhibits create a historical narrative of a benevolent Moroccan royalty that
has protected its Jewish subjects over time. As such, they work to reinforce the monarchy’s
legitimacy. The Museum of Moroccan Judaism displays photographs of Mohammed VI visiting
Synagogue Fassyne after its renovation by the Foundation for Judeo-Moroccan Heritage, a
written address from Mohammed VI from the inauguration of Synagogue Ettedgui, and a Letter
of Gratitude from the international Jewish rabbinical community thanking the king for
supporting the renovations of Jewish heritage sites.
Bayt Dakira further bolsters the narrative of a benevolent Moroccan monarchy by
highlighting the harmonious relationships of a series of royals with the Moroccan-Jewish
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community. An entire room of Bayt Dakira presents information about the Jewish royal advisors
to past kings and sultans, starting from Samuel Sumbal, advisor to Sultan Mohammed Ben
Abdallah in the 1700s, to André Azoulay, present-day advisor to Mohammed VI. In the atrium
are also three large information plaques with quotes from the two Moroccan kings preceding
Mohammed VI—Mohammed V and Hassan II—demonstrating their embrace of Moroccan Jews.
In a 1956 address to the Israelite committee of Casablanca, Mohammed V is cited as saying, “We
must always act in the national framework and not the confessional [religious] one. All
Moroccans, Muslims, and Israelites are subjects of the same country.” Next to an image of King
Hassan II and then-Crown Prince Mohammed VI welcoming a Grand Rabbi are displayed
excerpts from Hassan II’s book The Genius of Moderation: Reflections on the Truths of Islam.
These excerpts read in part: “If Arabs on one side and Jews on the other put together their
ingenuity and their intellectual faculties in common … we are convinced that the descendants of
Abraham … will find, each on their side, what could guarantee dignity, liberty and sovereignty.”
In highlighting these statements by Mohammed V and Hassan II, as well as the history of royal
Jewish advisors, Bayt Dakira creates a narrative of a lineage of royal benevolence which is now
embodied by His Majesty Mohammed VI.
Through displays of photographs and visual symbolism, Bayt Dakira keeps Mohammed
VI omnipresent in the visitor’s mind, ensuring that any positive feelings that the visitor might
feel towards Bayt Dakira are also felt towards the monarchy. At special events like conferences
and musical performances, a 4x3-foot portrait of Mohammed VI as well as a Moroccan flag are
set up in the atrium next to speakers and performers. This portrait emphasizes the King’s
centrality to every element of Bayt Dakira. As visitors enter Bayt Dakira, the first things that
they see are a Torah and Quran displayed side by side, and behind and above these texts, a video
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recording of King Mohammed VI’s visit to Bayt Dakira. This striking visual underscores
Mohammed VI’s position as Commander of the Faithful, keeping him at the center of Bayt
Dakira and the viewer’s mind.
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Conclusion
Through the distortion of history and memory, Bayt Dakira spreads Moroccan political
values abroad, portraying the nation as a pluralist, liberal democracy to the world. In doing so, it
brings Morocco closer to the United States and Israel, its political and economic allies.
Advancing Morocco’s image as a united pluralist nation also serves to consolidate Morocco’s
diversity of religious and ethnic communities under King Mohammed VI. This study also
demonstrates the ways in which cultural and academic diplomacy can provide a neutral platform
from which nations can subtly critique Israel.
Bayt Dakira is just one example of an outwardly apolitical Moroccan institution being
wielded to build the nation’s soft power and cement the monarch’s power. More research into the
diplomatic functions of these other institutions and comparisons between these institutions is
necessary. The field would also benefit from further research into the differences between
state-funded and private organizations that advance Morocco’s diplomatic goals abroad and build
a national identity at home. This research could also be built upon through studies examining the
extent to which Moroccan-Jewish culture maintains its authenticity when wielded for the
purposes of cultural diplomacy. Lastly, Bayt Dakira deserves significantly more attention from
researchers than this single, undergraduate independent study. To fully understand the ways in
which Bayt Dakira builds Morocco’s soft power, each of its functions—as a museum, religious
space, research center, educational space, and tourist attraction—deserves individual attention.
The impact of Bayt Dakira on its visitors also deserves its own study. Some visitors come
into Bayt Dakira more interested in learning about Jewish culture than about Jewish-Muslim
co-existence. Others already hold too many biases against Muslims to be convinced by Bayt
Dakira’s messages of peace and tolerance. But for what seems like the vast majority of the site’s
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visitors, Bayt Dakira’s emphasis on subjective memory over historical objectivity helps them to
connect emotionally with Essaouira’s history of Jewish-Muslim co-existence and to internalize
the values of peace and tolerance promoted by Bayt Dakira. Bayt Dakira’s emphasis on memory
also allows visitors of Moroccan-Jewish heritage to project their family’s memories onto the
space and to see themselves represented. We need to better understand the benefits and
disadvantages of advancing distorted historical narratives and incorporating memory into history.
Doing so will teach us how to spread messages of tolerance and peace without sacrificing our
direct critiques and confrontations of injustice.
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